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Introduction
After reading Peter Fitzpatrick’s2 previous book 
entitled The Mythology of Modern Law, one would won-
der what boundaries could be expanded and what de-
velopments could be made after uncovering the mythical 
foundation of law in modernity3. In a way the response 
was given in Modernism and the Grounds of Law4.
The book is divided in two parts: Part 1 – “Orien-
tation” and Part 2 – “Instantiation”. Fitzpatrick teaches 
us how to engage in deconstruction and critical theory 
with reflections on the origin of law and its (dis)place-
ment in modernity (Part 1). Then the author offers a 
distinguished view on nationalism, imperialism and glo-
balism (Part 2). All of those are related with modernity 
that persists throughout the Occident’s development. 
Modern law beyond modernity: Society, modernism  
and grounds of Law by Peter Fitzpatrick
Direito moderno para além da modernidade: sociedade,  
modernismo e fundamentos do Direito por Peter Fitzpatrick
1 Universidade Católica de Pernambuco. Centro de Ciências Sociais, Departamento de Ciências Jurídicas. Rua do Príncipe 526, Boa Vista, 50050-900, Recife, PE, Brasil.
2 Peter Fitzpatrick is currently Anniversary Professor of Law at Birkbeck, University of London and Honorary Professor of Law at the University of Kent.
3 The idea of writing this review appeared while Daniel Carneiro Leão Romaguera was studying for the London Critical Theory Summer School held at the Birkbeck In-
stitute for Humanities. The summer course was held at Birkbeck from June 29th to July 10th with names such as Wendy Brown, Slavoj Zizek, Costas Douzinas, David Har-
vey, Etienne Balibar, among other speakers. It consisted of two weeks of intense discussions with critical academic legal thinkers from all over the world. This experience 
was essential to Romaguera’s research on human rights and decolonial thinking under the guidance of Professor João Paulo Allain Teixeira, coauthor of this book review.
4 The book Modernism and the Grounds of Law has no published translation in Portuguese. Therefore the original title is used in this review.
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The book starts with reflections attached to 
psychoanalysis and philosophy where law must be 
looked at in its social and cultural contexts. Fitzpat-
rick makes an effort to understand the innumerous 
developments of law’s origins that indicate a continued 
aftermath in action. A reflection is made on Totem and 
Taboo. Fitzpatrick leads us to understand what is at 
stake in law when it is “opposed” to categories such as 
society, savagery, transgression and alterity (chapter 2). 
To conclude this analysis, the author considers what 
succeeds the apposition of law’s origin by considering 
its space, time, functionality and limits (chapter 3). Then, 
in Part 2, Fitzpatrick articulates a critique of national-
ism, imperialism and globalism (chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
All of those are related to the central problem of mod-
ern law.
Romaguera e Teixeira | Modern law beyond modernity: Society, modernism and grounds of Law by Peter Fitzpatrick
254 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 8(2):253-259
In Modernism and the Grounds of Law one can re-
ally start to understand the task of critical legal theory, 
especially with the connection made between law’s ori-
gins and authority manifested since modernity. 
Fitzpatrick’s work combines historical consider-
ations and reflexive philosophy to go beyond jurispru-
dence which – by the way – reproduces the sense of 
self-founding in modern law by not addressing law’s con-
tradictions. Fitzpatrick’s historical inquiry appreciates an 
eternal return of law related to modern mythology.
In this sense, the author indicates law as a promi-
nent concept for modernity and its advance to a global 
arrangement. Not only does law continue to take place as 
essential to occidental societies but does that by denying 
violence and hiding its impossibility through determinacy/
responsiveness. So a paradox can be distinguished as cen-
tral in Fitzpatrick’s book: if on the one hand law must 
be open and resist whatever is antithetical to it, on the 
other hand law must respond to antithetical phenomena 
precisely because of the need to be determinate. Equally 
the book opposes established dualisms such as: inclusion/
exclusion; universal/particular; global/local; national/inter-
national; civilization/savagery; law/violence; etc.
As for the writing, a distinctively poetic manner 
along with keen philosophical reflections is Fitzpatrick’s 
signature. With much eloquence, indeed, his book is a 
unique contribution to critical theory and legal philoso-
phy. Most importantly, Fitzpatrick’s efforts were able to 
relate all subjects mentioned above as an elaboration of 
problems inherent in modern law.
Law’s origin
Fitzpatrick starts questioning modern law as 
self-conscious according to society’s origin in Totem and 
Taboo5. Freud’s fecund text presents a genealogy of law 
confronted with occidental myths and attempts to lo-
cate the origins of society in the primal parricide (Fitz-
patrick, 2001, p. 9), addressing “the originary questions 
of grounds” (Derrida, 1989, p. 60).
While interpreting the parricide, the author 
identifies two different moments that indicate the ori-
gins of law. The first one comes with the end of the 
savage primal horde existing under the complete power 
of the father, when the supreme authority is killed and 
consumed by his sons. That is the first origin, the mo-
ment when the conflict among brothers spread.
The second origin is a result of the war for the 
position of the omnipotent father. After the era of con-
flict, the sons agree to a social contract which estab-
lishes law among them. And this order subsists in oppo-
sition to the return of savagery, or, to put it better, the 
primal horde. It is important to note that this second 
moment is not considered in Freud’s traditional reading 
as society’s origin (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 11). So why are 
these two positions considered origins? And how can 
they be related with modern law?
For Fitzpatrick there is a double standard de-
mand for law in modernity. It needs to be determined 
but at the same time must open up new possibilities. 
More precisely, law should be ever-responsive and inde-
terminable. The claim to self-assuredness and stability of 
law is related with the primal horde, but law must also 
be responsive to all that is beyond position6. Therefore 
only by combining those two opposite positions the ori-
gins of law can be understood.
The precise point to understand this reasoning 
is the killing of the father (totemic death) which de-
termines and invites newness into the world. As much 
as law is set against savagery and brutality, it has to be 
necessarily violent to determine itself, therefore it re-
mains savage. One can recall a failure in law’s conception 
that leads to its impossibility, for securing law demands a 
primal savagery. In that way, savagery inhabits civilization, 
although it is usually denied or recognized as secondary, 
knowable and exceptional in civilized society. 
It is also important to point out Fitzpatrick’s dis-
agreement with Freud’s comprehension of “deed” – a 
central object in Freud’s psychoanalytical studies. For 
Fitzpatrick there is something before desire and there is 
already a society to perform the deed: “Since the deed 
originates human culture and our ability to know, and to 
order and represent what we know, how may Freud so 
safely know it?” (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 12).
Relating deed with savagery means that a state 
of savagery only exists because there is a civilization to 
endow it with knowable existence. And that’s precisely 
why its origin can only be represented in a myth7. There 
is no settlement about the occurrence of the deed, 
which means that we cannot be sure whether it hap-
pened or not. This is an inevitable uncertainty (Fitzpat-
rick, 2001, p. 17).
Fitzpatrick recognizes the elusiveness of the or-
igin and that there is no return to a positive origin that 
5 Freud’s myth that accounts for the lost origin of society (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 9).
6 “The modern rule of law, with its avowal of assured stability and ultimacy of determination, seems closer to the condition of the primal horde. For law to rule, it has 
to be ever-responsive and indeterminate, capable to extending to the infinite variety which often confronts it” (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 2).
7 “Myths are interminable” (Lévi-Strauss, 1968, p. 6).
Romaguera e Teixeira | Modern law beyond modernity: Society, modernism and grounds of Law by Peter Fitzpatrick
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 8(2):253-259                              255
contains civilization’s progress. On the contrary, myth 
is not about resolving the irresolution of the origin or 
anything else, but rather a working active force in a 
process that moves infinitely and intrinsically beyond 
any origin. 
But how can modernity reject myth and still 
be accountable and self-grounding8? By exploring this 
paradox Fitzpatrick reveals how myth manifests itself in 
modernity. 
For Fitzpatrick post-mythical times in modernity 
still rely on the duality of myths by mediating its bound-
aries and fixing a singular reality, but admits no positive 
solution. The only way of doing that is through a nega-
tive mediator, ambiguous and unseen. Freud’s myth is 
fulfilled by “savagery”9 – Derrida claims that irresolution 
in the myth of origin is held by savagery (Derrida, 1976, 
part II, chapter 3); for Zizek savagery is a fantasy filling 
the space of origin (Zizek, 1991, p. 211).
The author takes an argumentative course to ex-
pose an eternal comeback of origin related with society’s 
existence, by exploring the irresolution in Freud’s myth 
through the analyses of society/civilization, individual be-
ing and the Oedipus complex related with savagery.
It is remarkable in Fitzpatrick’s writing how the 
dead father becomes stronger than the living one had 
ever been10, just as the identity of the sons and violence 
are bound together in society’s triumph, which indicates 
the reliance upon savagery. In its normal state, hence, 
society appeals to violence in an inevitable repetition of 
the parricide (again and again), whenever the cherished 
fruit of the crime – appropriation of the paternal at-
tributes – threatened to disappear (Freud, 1960, p. 145). 
Therefore the return to origin has to be eternal; thus, 
origin is what is now (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 27). Also the 
Oedipus complex is placed in this analysis as the con-
vergence point that justifies parricide. The affection that 
was previously pushed back by the usual discourse justi-
fies civilization. 
Overall, Fitzpatrick concludes that savagery is 
within society yet always and ominously apart, there’s an 
opening found in society where origins take place and 
where savagery continually comes and goes. In subse-
quent reflections we will see that this space is precisely 
the point of entry of law. Law is set in between: deter-
minately different and yet maintaining the sameness to 
what went before (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 33). 
There is always a return to determination. Fitz-
patrick, in a Derridian way, affirms that death is not only 
dissolution and the loss of everything but an inexorable 
determination. Therefore the power of the dead father 
can be responsively extended to anything that is not 
only within but also beyond present existence. 
The term of settlement of the father is manifest-
ed against emptiness: “The totem enshrines the terms of 
settlement emerging from the primal parricide – the ‘sa-
cred’ taboos ‘which could not be broken’” (Freud, 1960, 
p. 104), but parricide must leave space for an adjustment 
to changing conditions of life. 
Thus for law to occupy the place of origin it must 
have the persistent force that goes beyond determina-
tion, and that is only possible through savagery, as it en-
shrines the decisive power of the restored father. Freud 
realized that: “[…] It is precisely as a societal container 
of savagery that law comes to be set against savagery 
and identified with Civilization” (Freud, 1985, p. 351). 
Law’s connection
The main engagement in this topic is about de-
rivative grounds of law set in modern dynamics, as law 
is grounded in modernity but inevitably must always go 
beyond its limits. Fitzpatrick relates law’s origins with 
modernity, for there is a sense of coherence in moder-
nity among origin, society, savagery, law and so on.
The hypothesis is that a pre-modern world – 
that modernity is so reputedly against – is intensified 
in modernity rather than eliminated. This is related with 
origin – situated among reflections of Freud’s Totem and 
Taboo which indicate a constant challenge of society’s 
constitution – also heightened in modernity.
This can only be explained by considering some 
paradoxes: determination/responsiveness; transgres-
sion/norm; alterity/sameness; savagery/civilized; individ-
uality/society; etc. All of these apparently opposite sides 
are invisible and unlikely characteristics of the rule of 
law, and it is very important to point out law’s obscurity 
in modernity by the connections made by Fitzpatrick 
(2001, p. 36).
Modern societies acquire content in a negative 
rejection of what is considered external to them, in this 
sense social identity descends from transgressions and 
alterities – alterities are absorbed by modern society 
8 We will see how law tends to occupy the place of origin (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 14).
9 “[…] Freud makes us put our position in question, and keep it in question, but somewhat more through what he fails to do in Totem and Taboo than through what he 
achieves there” (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 12).
10 The begetters of civilization (sons) become its bellicose contrary by assuming the place of the father; that is why he is even stronger when dead (Fitzpatrick, 2001, 
p. 15).
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through continuous transgressions and dissolutions of 
the norm going beyond its limit.
An important step is made by uncovering the nega-
tive side of modernity as we have never been modern in 
a way that the enlightened world professes (Latour, 1993). 
Fitzpatrick is aware of “A preface of transgression” 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 29-52) and its relevance to expose an 
inseparable relation between transgression and norm, 
stretching to the point that continuous transgression – 
as it goes and comes to – creates a disciplinary normal-
ity. Authority is able to affect a specific and determinant 
position yet be responsively illimitable. So transgression 
indicates an eternal return in mythical terms too.
Therefore transgression in modernity creates and 
secures a normalized world (Foucault, 1977, p. 32-35) 
by the “eternal return” of origin. Law, as Freud said, is 
not a determined fixity (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 15).
A parasitic dimension is seen (Fitzpatrick, 2001, 
p. 32) as law has an integrally responsive openness but 
also has to meet a demand for decision and must stand 
a “fresh judgment” (Derrida, 1992a, p. 23), that is, it 
cannot be set in a determinant already known. At this 
moment, however, law must be contained in individual 
determinacy; and somehow there must be a place of 
being-in-common (Blanchot, 1992, p. 25). 
For Fitzpatrick this reveals a paradoxical price in 
individuality as modern society imposes itself on a tran-
scendent and social bond above and beyond the “other”. 
That is only possible because of alterity; in order to de-
fine “Us” there must be “Them”, and then we come to 
recognize ourselves as different (Shore, 1993, p. 782). The 
author complies with the argument in Said’s distinguished 
work Orientalism (Said, 1985) claiming that modernity 
crucifies cultural fundamentalism and imposes the oc-
cidental view as universal with its mythical progression.
This universality of modernity is not set apart 
from the other, but creates itself by the otherness. So, 
this alterity is absolutely excluded but included at the 
same time. Fitzpatrick reveals a pivotal paradox: “the 
whole consistency of our position is in fact that we are 
negating the other” (Lacan, 1989, chapter 9).
In modernity, alterities are necessarily diverse to 
match innumerous situations, but must also be reduced 
to sameness. Therefore, only by a process of generating 
identity modernity’s coherence is built, but with a con-
tinuous distance and caution for the excluded not to be 
too included. Fitzpatrick acknowledges that there is an 
outside of Europe, immerse and denied in modernity.  
Colonialism is the extreme boundary of this 
modern project, for the colonized is an ultimate alter-
ity that must be redeemed through modernity, but this 
reveals its own impossibility and denial. A wide-ranging 
classification from “negro” to white European is seen 
in the predominant myth of modernity, as those ca-
pable of defining identity promote the inclusion/exclu-
sion of “humans”.
Fitzpatrick finishes his second chapter by quot-
ing Water Benjamin: “laws of fate” are taken over and 
“elevated by law to measures of the person” (Benjamin, 
1979, p. 127). The subaltern is pushed beyond measures, 
mostly by the infamous legacy of colonialism.
In Chapter 3, the author concludes the conflict 
of self-founding in modern law as law’s self-grounding is 
tested against the seemingly imperative grounds of ac-
tion in time and space; again, law takes the position of 
origin. This is what Derrida called the paradox of iter-
ability (Derrida, 1992a, p. 43).
To explain those subjects, Fitzpatrick appeals 
to “deconstruction”. As sameness and difference stand 
in-between law and justice (Derrida, 1992a, p. 28), one 
can see time in law beyond significant, but time is also 
something present in law’s decision. As for space, law 
is oriented in-between responsiveness and determinacy 
(universal and particular): “Law’s generality must be spe-
cific” (Neumann, 1957, p. 28). On the other hand, vio-
lence is not something outside and justified to maintain 
law when it is threatened. On the contrary, violence is 
intrinsic to legal action (Derrida, 1992a, p. 39).
Therefore, by stretching legal comprehension, 
Fitzpatrick conducts a profound analysis of law in mo-
dernity among innumerous contradictions – unknown 
by the rigors of positivist jurisprudence – by relating 
law’s arrangements with European dominance (Fitzpat-
rick, 2001, p. 102). 
Nationalism
After reflections on modernity and law, the au-
thor examines our recent models of society – nation-
alism, imperialism and globalism – by investigating the 
Occident’s expansion and the spectrums of modern law 
among its mythical origins. 
For Fitzpatrick modern law is related with na-
tionalism11, and nation shares with law a common 
ground, particularly placed and universally uncontained. 
A nation can neither be based on an integral recognition 
11 We must take into account not only the particular nation of blood and soil but also nation as universally inclined beyond its territorially bounded plot (Fitzpatrick, 
2001, p. 85).
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of its particularity nor be based on boundless universal-
ity – Fitzpatrick relates Gellner’s universal claims with 
Smith’s particularity (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1986) – and 
paradoxically a nation approaches universality against 
particular ways of being by a dominant view (European), 
as there is a particularization of nations through occi-
dental patterns (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 55). 
Even though different nations emerge out of dif-
ferent situations, what surrounds them appears to be an 
immutable scenario: “a spectacular tide of nationalism 
[…] rising in Europe and on a world scale, submerging 
everything on its way” (Lowy, 1993, p. 125). 
Nation is a crepuscular construct found in the 
west, not only an enforcement of a particular view 
from Europe but the realization of universal history12. 
In Hegel’s words: “[…] the history of the world travels 
from east to west, for Europe is absolutely the end of 
history, Asia the beginning” (Hegel, 1952, p. 351).
So the apotheosis of nation (homogenization) 
must be considered among alterities, the insuperable 
“others”, as for the state of giving birth to nations is 
antithetical (Balibar, 1991, p. 45). Fitzpatrick recognizes 
the unknown “negro” as the starting point of Hegel’s 
spirit of history (Hegel, 1956). On other hand, European 
cultures are essential to give life to universal history 
(Chatterjee, 1986, p. 2). For Derrida the capital paradox 
of universality (Derrida, 1992b, p. 72) is what gives the 
(im)possibility of nation, as a particular nation brings the 
universal to itself.
To conclude, somehow, nation identity is the nega-
tion of the other yet still integral to it (Fitzpatrick, 2001, 
p. 129), but that is only possible when law gets in-between 
universal and particular (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 101). There is 
a “nation of law” and a “law of nation” when sovereignty 
justifies a general law uniformly in nations’ territories. 
So, in law’s “Europeanness” and homogenizing 
system of rule, the birth of nation comes from mak-
ing arrangements in nationalism beyond the nation itself, 
and Fitzpatrick considers imperialism and globalism in 
similar terms.
Imperialism
In this chapter Fitzpatrick discusses the after-
math of nationalism as he understands our recent mod-
els of society as reworked variants of the modern state.
First of all, imperial history must be related with 
international law as the Occident entails liberal terms 
and colonialism. Fitzpatrick makes a peculiar interpreta-
tion of Vitoria’s De Indis (Scott, 2013). It is well estab-
lished in international doctrine that Vitoria is a precur-
sor of humanism and international law. For Fitzpatrick 
there is a misconception on the interpretation of for 
Vitoria’s work does not represent a humanistic secular-
ism but rather a scholastic theology in its apotheosis.
There is a “first” natural law, the natural law of all 
men, that including Indians, but there is also a “second” – 
rationality – that despises the lack of Europeanness of In-
dians, who are at best redeemable. In this “second” natural 
law either they were in a deviant place beyond the reach 
of natural law or recognized as humans but as inferior. 
The Indians were considered initially humans as 
participant subjects in law and had a right of dominus, 
but in any case of deviation from European ways they 
were kept outside natural law, for example, the loss 
of the right of property. In a way that is not much dif-
ferent, Hegel denies sovereignty or a universally valid 
embodiment of laws to uncivilized people (Hegel, 1952, 
p. 218-219). This argument sets the right of dominium 
in international law that intensified the duality between 
civilized and savage. 
Fitzpatrick recognizes the importance of proper-
ty as a natural right for colonialist expansion in America, 
indicating that there was a conquest of land and people, 
not a discovery. The colonial settlement was made as 
the Indians had – at best –a “right” to dominium as long 
as submitted to natural (European) law.
The author engages in a profound investigation 
of the distinct doctrine of discovery in modernity, to 
be understood as point d’appui of the sweeping history 
of –imperial – international law.
Once natural law is related with occidental de-
velopment it can be understood as imperialism and the 
liberal telos of civilized nations, and natural law led to an 
obligatory reliance on human conception towards Euro-
pean and colonial dominance (Anghie, 1999).
Fitzpatrick argues that imperialism conducts the 
affirmation of universal committed to reclaim the colo-
nies and to redeem them as well. Within the occidental 
constitution the dynamics of colonialism are imposed 
on “savages”, which – not who – are the irresolution of 
colonialism. The constitutive negation of their civiliza-
tion brought exclusion and denial to imperialism in law’s 
responsive dimension. As every attempt at a different 
way of being would indicate resistance to natural law, 
progress, society and rights, it must be contained.
12 Fitzpatrick explains nationalism considering the historical context of national bourgeoisies and their specialized élite, “[…] [who] in effect tended to replace the 
colonial force with a new class-based and ultimately exploitative one, which replicated the old colonial structures in new terms” (Said, 1985, p. 269).
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Similarly to the critical arrangement of the previ-
ous chapter, under a topic called “The Nations of Law 
and the Laws of Nation”, Fitzpatrick indicates how the 
political body must be aware of its surroundings in im-
perialism. There is a need to go beyond its limits, and 
that is how nations shaped the conception of interna-
tional law, for internationalism has no room in itself. 
Rather than being just a project of some nations, 
internationalism is an ultimate form of coherence. A uni-
versality of nations can only be constituted by the eleva-
tion of its included particularity (comes from negation) 
as exemplary of the universal, so the condition of “na-
tion” is related with the European concept of modern 
state, contradictorily opposed to savagery and the re-
sult of universal progress. In this sense, Fitzpatrick iden-
tifies a community of nations set in international law, not 
through the substitution of nationalism for internation-
alism, but rather a relation of common dependency be-
tween nations (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p. 168). Therefore the 
recognition of rights – natural rights – is left to a “state” 
recognized in international law as sovereign. 
International law comes from nations but also 
provides the criteria of “nation” by particular require-
ments of western patterns of political recognition (Fitz-
patrick, 2001, p. 150). A commonality of civilized identi-
ties comes into play among liberal declarations, as the 
other – colonized – is always inferior and a new state of 
things is accomplished (Zizek, 1992, p. 97).
In this sense, there is an international spread of 
the modern nation as international law becomes a mat-
ter between sovereign and other uncivilized states that 
are intrinsically contrasted to the former.
Globalism
We could summarize the last chapter with the 
analysis of globalization as a “globalized nationalism” 
(Douzinas, 2000, p. 212). Fitzpatrick, in a skeptical way, 
doesn’t agree with the idea of globalism as a newly-cre-
ated world, but rather sees it as a continuance of impe-
rialism, “imperialism without colonies” (Magdoff, 1972).
According to this point of view, globalism reaches 
the limit of modern universalism; law seems to arrive at 
an apotheosis with globalization, for it is not attached to 
a place of determinacy but reaches a vacuity as law tran-
scends national territories in the most rarefied spaces. 
The universal became integrally tied to the local, there is 
no longer a mythical transcendent universal but this em-
pirically bounded global product (Friedman, 1973, p. 72).
Globalism is set in a particularity of exclusion but 
offers a place to universal inclusion that never comes 
to an end while it spreads particularities all over the 
world, with a paradigmatic transition to localized global: 
“the successful globalization of a given localism” (Santos, 
1995, p. 348).
The scenario combines neoliberal economy, 
mass information and imperative governance, along with 
human rights, international rule of law and democratiza-
tion. One can say that the imposition of democracy on 
the four corners of our world and human rights are now 
the pervasive criteria of law. Also globalization arrange-
ments since the 20th century derive from an emergence 
in the post-war period of the international human rights 
regime based on normative agreements and substantive 
norms with high moral voltage (Santos, 1995, p. 330). 
In Modernism and the Grounds of Law Fitzpatrick 
makes a distinctive contribution to critical legal thinking 
with a profound analysis of law and modernity by con-
sidering historical, philosophical and political develop-
ments to draw conclusions in the realm of law as myths 
must be undone. 
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